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BUILDING NATIONAL AND REGIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CONFLICT-
RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE: 
FROM PROSECUTIONS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA TO THE AFRICAN 
COURT OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 
 
Kirsten Campbell, Department of Sociology, Goldsmiths 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In 1995, the first criminal proceedings began before the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY).  The case of the Prosecutor v Tadic included the first numerated 
charges of conflict-related sexual violence.1  This case marked the first step in building 
accountability for sexual violence as an international crime, with the ICTY leading progressive 
developments in this area over the next twenty years.  However, Tadic also showed the 
challenges of providing accountability for conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), including 
the failure to initially indict these crimes, challenges to protective measures, and the withdrawal 
of sexual violence victim-witnesses.  As prosecutions of CRSV began in the successor states 
of the former Yugoslavia, it became apparent that national courts also faced many of these 
same challenges in building national accountability for CRSV. 
 
During this same period, the African Union adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Malabo Protocol).  
When the Protocol enters in force, the Malabo Protocol will establish an International Criminal 
                                                      
1 Prosecutor v Duško Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, ICTY, <http://www.icty.org/case/tadic/4>, accessed 15 August 2018. 
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Law Section and extend the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACJHPR) to include international crimes of conflict-related sexual violence.  
The inclusion of these crimes in the jurisdiction of the ACJHPR is an important advance.  But 
what challenges is the Court likely to face in building accountability for CRSV? And what 
lessons might be useful to learn from the previous experiences of the former Yugoslavia in 
prosecuting these crimes? 
 
The prosecution of CRSV together with other crimes committed in the conflicts in the State of 
the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) marked a major development in 
building accountability for these crimes.  These prosecutions established the legal basis of these 
crimes, showed that they were an integral part of the illegal conduct of these conflicts, and that 
they could be successfully prosecuted at international and national levels.  However, these 
prosecutions also reveal the challenges of building national and regional accountability for 
CRSV that the ACJHPR is likely to face.  The article frames accountability for CRSV in terms 
of a model of ‘gender justice’, which insists that criminal justice should be part of a process 
that transforms, rather than reproduces, gendered inequalities.  This article focuses on two key 
sets of challenges to building ‘gender justice’ accountability for CRSV, which are (1) 
developing ‘best practice’ within regional and national courts, and (2) linking these 
prosecutions to peace processes and post-conflict reconstruction.  The article then sets out a set 
of guiding principles for developing a ‘gender justice’ framework that can build effective and 
equitable CRSV prosecutions and contribute to post-conflict justice for these crimes. 
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2 Prosecuting CRSV in the Region of the Former Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia:  International, Regional, and National Accountability 
 
The ACJHPR will be the first regional court to be established with the jurisdiction to prosecute 
international crimes.  However, it is arguable that modern international criminal tribunals have 
provided ‘regional’ accountability since Nuremburg and Tokyo.2  There is no ‘regional’ court 
for the former Yugoslavia as such.  However, the ICTY, together with the national courts of 
the successor states in the former Yugoslavia, should be considered as providing a system of 
‘regional’ accountability.  Similarly to earlier international tribunals, the ICTY prosecuted 
crimes committed in all regions of the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY), both as specific theatres of conflict within, and broader criminal 
campaigns across, this territory.  Under the Statute of the International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY Statute),3 the ICTY 
had supremacy over the national courts of the successor states of SFRY since its establishment 
in 1993.  By the end of 2016, the ICTY had prosecuted 78 individuals, or 48% of 161 accused, 
with charges of sexual violence included in their indictments in completed cases.  Of those 
accused, 32 accused, or approximately 41%, were convicted for their responsibility for sexual 
violence.4  
 
Despite significant challenges, formal regional co-operation has been established between the 
                                                      
2 For further discussion of ‘the regional’ dimensions of ICL, see William A Schabas, ‘Regions, Regionalism and 
International Criminal Law’ (2007) 4:3 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 3 and Matiangai VS Sirleaf, 
‘Regionalism, Regime Complexes, and the Crisis in International Criminal Justice’ (2015) 54 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 699. 
3 UN Doc S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), adopted by Security Council on 25 May 1993, UN 
Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
4 ICTY, Crimes of Sexual Violence in Numbers, <http://www.icty.org/en/features/crimes-sexual-violence/in-numbers> 
accessed 15 August 2018. 
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ICTY and prosecutors’ offices, and between the prosecutors’ offices in each successor state.  
With the adoption of the Completion Strategy in 2003 and the planned closure of the ICTY 
from this time onwards, there was increasing focus on strengthening national capacity to 
prosecute war crimes in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia.  These successor states 
are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia.  
In contrast to the ICTY, the national courts of the successor states apply national criminal codes 
that set out international offences under national law (whether of the former SFRY or successor 
state criminal codes), or prosecute these offenses as ‘ordinary’ domestic criminal offences.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina (2005), Croatia (2003) Kosovo (2000) and Serbia (2003) established 
specialised war crimes chambers at state level or ‘county’ level, or specialist panels within 
local courts.5  However, they also prosecute these crimes in ‘lower level’ ‘ordinary’ or ‘general 
jurisdiction’ criminal courts. 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is typically described as the ‘most affected’ country in the conflict.  It 
has undertaken the largest number of national prosecutions in the region before the War Crimes 
Chamber of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (‘BiH State Court’).  By the end of 
2016, 59 of 183 accused, or approximately 30%, were charged with sexual violence in the BiH 
State Court.  There are currently 58 ongoing CRSV cases, with another 600 under 
investigation.6  In the other national jurisdictions of Serbia, Kosovo, and Croatia, no systematic 
or comparable data is available.  However, it is clear that sexual violence has been prosecuted 
in significantly fewer numbers and at lower conviction rates.7  
                                                      
5 In the case of Bosnia and Kosovo, war crimes prosecutions initially included international judges and prosecutors. 
6 Preliminary Findings, GoJ Project, 2017. See also OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (OSCE), ‘Towards 
Justice for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Progress before Courts in BiH 2014–2016’, 
20 June 2017, <http://www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/324131>, accessed 16 August 2018 (OSCE 
Report 2014–2016). 
7 Systematic and comparable reviews of CRSV prosecutions are not available. For information on prosecutions, 
Humanitarian Law Centre, ‘No Justice for Wartime Victims of Sexual Violence’, <http://www.hlc-
rdc.org/?p=30745&lang=de>, accessed 4 August 2018; Humanitarian Law Centre Kosovo, ‘As Time Passes, Justice 
for War Crimes fades’ <http://hlc-kosovo.org/?wpdmdl=5098>, accessed 4 August 2018, 470; Documenta, 
‘Monitoring War Crime Trials Report for 2013’ <https://www.documenta.hr/en/izvje%C5%A1taj-o-
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These CRSV prosecutions are instructive for regional and national systems seeking to build 
greater accountability for these crimes.  The case of Rwanda is also clearly important.  
However, despite the significance of the early International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) decisions on CRSV, overall the ICTR has a highly criticised record on CRSV and there 
have been notably few cases heard before Rwandan national courts.8  The extensive body of 
CRSV prosecutions in the former Yugoslavia provides an opportunity to consider how to build 
greater accountability for CRSV at a regional and national level.  They also reveal the 
significant challenges of courts seeking to prosecute these crimes.  Moreover, these 
prosecutions before the ICTY and BiH State Court have been subject to extensive internal and 
external review that is not available in the Rwandan context.9  For these reasons, the following 
discussion focuses on CRSV prosecutions in the former Yugoslavia. 
 
In the region of the former Yugoslavia, two key sets of challenges emerge in building 
accountability for CRSV.  These challenges have been identified from an analysis of the ICTY 
and BiH State Court experience.  This analysis draws on the OSCE and ICTY OTP reviews of 
CRSV prosecutions, as well as five years of fieldwork in the ICTY and the former Yugoslavia 
                                                      
pra%C4%87enju-su%C4%91enja-za-2013.-godinu.html>, accessed 4 August 2018, 66. Macedonia had not 
undertaken any prosecutions as at the time of writing in 2018. 
8 See Anne-Marie De Brouwer, Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence (Intersentia, 2005) pp. 351–
353, and Hilmi M Zawati. Fair Labelling and the Dilemma of Prosecuting Gender-Based Crimes at the International 
Criminal Tribunals (Oxford University Press, 2014) and Emily Amick, ‘Trying International Crimes on Local Lawns’ 
(2011) 20(2) Colum. J. Gender & L. 1. 
9 The ICTR Office of the Prosecutor has produced the ‘Best Practice Manual for the Prosecution of Sexual Violence’, 
ICTR, 2014, <http://unictr.unmict.org/en/documents/best-practices-manuals-and-conference-reports>, (‘ICTR Best 
Practice Manual’), accessed 17 August 2018. The reviews of the ICTY include the book length, Serge Brammertz and 
Michelle Jarvis, Prosecuting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence at the ICTY (Oxford University Press, 2016), and three 
significant OSCE reports on CRSV prosecutions before the BiH Court since 2004: OSCE Report 2014–2016 [n 6]; 
OSCE, ‘Combatting Impunity for Sexual Violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Progress and Challenges, An Analysis 
of Criminal Proceedings Before the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina between 2005 and 2013’, 3 April 2014, (‘OSCE 
Report 2005–2013 BiH Court’), <http://www.osce.org/bih/117051>; and OSCE, ‘Combatting Impunity for Sexual 
Violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Progress and Challenges, An Analysis of Criminal Proceedings Before the 
Courts of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska, and Brcko District between 2004 and 2014’, 
3 July 2015, <http://www.osce.org/bih/171906>, (‘OSCE Report 2004–2014 District and Entity Courts’). Both reports 
were accessed on 4 August 2018. 
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examining CRSV prosecutions.10  This analysis shows that these two sets of challenges to 
building accountability are: firstly, how to develop ‘best practice’ prosecutions to provide 
greater criminal accountability for CRSV; and secondly, how to link criminal accountability 
for international crimes and post-conflict justice processes. 
 
2.1 The First Challenge for Building Criminal Accountability for CRSV:   
Developing ‘Best Practice’ Prosecutions of CRSV Crimes 
 
 
‘Best practice prosecutions’ are typically understood in terms of implementing international 
‘best practice’ standards.  While identifying and implementing international standards are 
important elements of developing greater accountability, the adoption of these standards is not 
sufficient to build accountability for CRSV as they will not necessarily provide gender just 
outcomes.  Rather, in a ‘gender justice’ approach, ‘best practice’ should be understood more 
broadly as ‘meaningful’ prosecutions that provide accurate and fair characterisation of crimes; 
appropriate punishment of those responsible; and significant and active victim participation 
and protection. 
 
A Defining CRSV as an International Crime 
 
The first and most crucial challenge in building accountability for CRSV concerns the 
recognition of sexual violence as a crime under international law.  Without the formal legal 
recognition of the criminality of that conduct under international law, it is not possible to 
prosecute sexual violence as a conflict-related crime or as a crime violating international 
                                                      
10 The GoJ Project, 2013–2017, <https://www.gold.ac.uk/genderofjustice/>, accessed 4 August 2018. 
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norms.  Accordingly, the first challenge for prosecutions of CRSV as an international crime is 
to establish the positive legal prohibition of these acts under international law. 
 
The criminal prohibition of sexual violence under international law first emerges in the context 
of armed conflict.  The development of the definition of sexual violence as an international 
crime at the ICTR and ICTY builds upon its prohibition as a serious violation of international 
humanitarian law.  The Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR only refer to rape as a crime against 
humanity, and in the case of the ICTR, additionally to rape, enforced prostitution, and indecent 
assault as outrages upon personal dignity, a violation of common article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions 1947.  The Tribunals did not develop elements of these crimes as such, but rather 
defined the elements of offences in their jurisprudence. 
 
The leading case, Akayesu, defines sexual violence (which includes rape) ‘as any act of a sexual 
nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive’.11  This 
category of prohibited acts includes rape, forced nudity,12 and the so-called ‘gender related 
crimes’ recognised by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC Statute’), 
such as forced pregnancy and enforced sterilisation.13  Sexual penetration marks the distinction 
between the physical element of rape and other sexual violence offences, and the intent to 
commit the act of penetration knowing that it occurs without the consent of the victim.14  
 
There is not yet a distinct crime of sexual violence under international law.  Rather, if the 
requisite elements are met, then sexual violence offences are prosecuted as war crimes, 
                                                      
11 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, 2 September 1998, para 688. See also: Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 
Judgement, 16 November 1998, para 478; Kvocka, Kos, Radic, Zigic, and Prcac, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, 
2001, para 180. 
12 Kvocka, para 180 
13 Kvocka, para 180. 
14 Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 and it-96-23/1-T, Judgement, 22 February 2001, para 460. 
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genocide, or crimes against humanity.  The crime of sexual violence under international law 
therefore consists of two parts.  The first part is the offence of sexual violence.  The second 
part is the ‘international’ element of the crime, that is, the violation of the laws and customs of 
war; the intent to destroy a protected group, or a systematic attack on a civilian population.  It 
is this context that is understood to ‘raise’ a sexual offence to the status of an international 
crime.15  It constitutes the ‘international’ elements of the crime that are distinct from a breach 
of civil rights or a domestic offence under national criminal codes. 
 
The Malabo Protocol follows this ‘established framework of international law’ in Articles 
28(B)–(D).  In terms of sexual violence, these provisions essentially reproduce Articles 5–7 of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, with the exception of Article 28(B), 
which additionally specifies ‘[a]cts of rape or any other form of sexual violence’ as an act of 
genocide.  This reflects the current position under international customary law.  Given that the 
substantive elements of sexual violence crimes under international law are not settled either in 
customary law or in the ICC jurisprudence, it is unclear as to whether the Court would draw 
on the ‘established framework of international law’, that is, international customary law, or the 
elements of offences and/or limited jurisprudence of the ICC, in developing its ‘elements of 
offences’ and definitions of these crimes.  As there is no reference to the definition of ‘gender’ 
provided by the ICC Statute, it is also unclear as to whether the ACJHPR would follow this 
highly criticised approach of the ICC, or whether it would seek to develop its own definition 
of gender.  It should also be noted that the other ‘transnational’ crimes proscribed under the 
Malabo Protocol, such as the trafficking of persons, may also have sexual violence elements.  
These questions of applicable law will raise issues of contravention of the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege in cases before the ACJHPR, but also in the national jurisdictions seeking to 
                                                      
15 Kunarac, para 410. 
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prosecute these crimes, since it is not settled by Article 31. 
 
There are considerable substantive issues in customary international criminal law concerning 
gender-based and sexual violence crimes.  These issues include the customary status of certain 
norms, the elements of core crimes, normative gaps in the legal framework, and areas of 
doctrinal uncertainty.  There is a lack of specificity and consistency in the definition of sexual 
violence as an international crime under customary international law.16  In terms of the 
contextual ‘international’ elements, for example, in relation to genocide, ‘gender’ is not 
recognised as a protected group under customary law, the ICC Statute, or the Malabo Protocol.  
Similarly, while the Protocol follows the ICC in recognising ‘gender’ as a group for the 
purposes of persecution as a crime against humanity, uncertainty still remains regarding the 
customary status of this norm.  In relation to war crimes, given the regional nature of these 
crimes, there is some question as to which norms apply according to their classification as an 
internal or international conflict, which may give rise to potential jurisdictional challenges.  
Finally, the elements of sexual violence are not settled under customary law.  The distinction 
between rape, sexual violence, or sexual assault remains to be fully clarified, as does consent 
as an element of the offence.  Other crimes, such as sexual enslavement or sexual torture, also 
require further elaboration. 
 
Both the limitations of the international legal framework and the question of applicable law 
have proved to be key issues for providing effective and equitable prosecutions before the 
ICTY and BiH State Court.  These prosecutions have faced numerous jurisdictional challenges, 
particularly focused on the nullum crimen principle in relation to CRSV.  These issues also can 
                                                      
16 For example, see Akayesu (n 11), Kunarac (n 11) and The Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi, Case No.  ICTR-2001-64-A 
Appeals Chamber Judgement, 2006, para 153.  For discussion, see Kirsten Campbell, ‘The Gender of Transitional 
Justice’ (2007) 1(3) International Journal of Transitional Justice 411–432, and Hilmi Zawati, Fair Labelling and the 
Dilemma of Prosecuting Gender-Based Crimes at the Tribunals, (Oxford University Press, 2014) 71 ff. 
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lead to narrow, incorrect, or overly restrictive interpretation or application of legal norms in 
justice policies, judicial interpretation, or prosecutorial practice.  Examples of these difficulties 
can be found in the overly restrictive judicial interpretation of substantive elements of offences, 
such as requiring proof of non-consent (but not for other crimes such as torture or 
enslavement),17 the inaccurate application of evidential norms, such as imposing higher 
evidentiary standards of proof to establish links between senior officials and sexual violence 
committed by subordinates than other crime, and incorrectly identifying modes of liability, 
such as requiring systematic war-time rape to establish leadership responsibility.18  While the 
ICTY and BiH State Court have led the development of, and often applied, a progressive CRSV 
jurisprudence, they have also been responsible for regressive applications of legal norms.19  
Where these issues have not been addressed, they have produced prejudicial approaches to 
CRSV, and inequitable judicial outcomes for its survivors. 
 
Prosecutions of sexual violence before the ACJHR are likely to face similar difficulties unless 
these issues are addressed by developing, for example, elements of crimes drawing upon 
customary international law, and/or requiring that national courts subject to the Court’s 
jurisdiction pass criminal codes incorporating more progressive norms. 
 
B Undertaking Meaningful Prosecutions of CRSV 
 
A fundamental building block of meaningful prosecutions is whether prosecutions capture the 
illegal conduct of conflict. In relation to CRSV, this requires capturing the different patterns of 
sexual violence in a given conflict, linking conflict-related sexual violence to other gender-
                                                      
17 Prosecutor v Milutinovic et al., Case No. ICTY IT-05-87-T, Trial Judgment, v. 1, para 201. 
18 For example, see Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T. 
19 See, for example, OSCE (n 6) and Brammertz and Jarvis (n 9). 
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based crimes, and contextualising sexual violence within the broader conflict. 
 
As the experience of the ICTY and BiH State Court shows, prosecutorial strategies and judicial 
findings on sexual violence in these courts may reveal only partial pictures of patterns of sexual 
violence, and their relationship to the wider crime base in which they occurred.  For example, 
the ICTY cases do not fully capture the different forms or pervasiveness of sexual violence, 
such as the different types of violence against men and women.20  They also do not adequately 
connect these acts to wider patterns of gender-based and general crime categories, such as 
connecting sexual violence committed during forcible displacement of women to a broader 
genocidal campaign.21  At the national level, CRSV prosecutions by the BiH State Court have 
focussed on lower level ‘commanders’ or direct perpetrators, due to the focus of ICTY 
prosecutions upon leadership cases. However, this can have the effect of characterising sexual 
violence as a criminal act of an individual, rather than as being part of organized or systemic 
crimes, or as being integrally related to the conflict itself. Accordingly, these crimes may not 
be adequately linked to the broader context of the illegal campaigns organised by the ‘most 
responsible’ at the highest levels in national prosecutions. As a result, CRSV may not be 
sufficiently contextualized within these conflicts in these prosecutions, in that they do not 
adequately situate these acts within (and connect them to) the context in which they are 
committed, including the broader campaign of crimes.22  With this framing, it is difficult to 
provide an accurate characterization of the crimes committed, to prosecute all forms of sexual 
and gender-based crimes committed, or to make links between direct perpetrators and the 
military and political leaders of the organisation to which they belong.  As a result, these crimes 
                                                      
20 Campbell (n 16) and for discussion see Brammertz and Jarvis (n 9). 
21 Brammertz and Jarvis (n 9) 320–332, at 325. 
22 Ibid, 216–219. For a discussion of these issues in the context of the ICTR, see Chiseche Salome Mibenge, Sex and 
International Tribunals: The Erasure of Gender from the War Narrative (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013) and 
Zawati (n 16). 
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are not adequately included in the public narratives of the conflict, and these prosecutions do 
not provide the public recognition of ‘victims as right-holders entitled to redress’ due to their 
experience of the conflict.23  
 
The ACJHPR will face the challenge of how to build meaningful prosecutions of CRSV both 
in those cases where it exercises complementary jurisdiction under Article 46H and in national 
courts prosecuting such cases.  In both cases, the challenge will be how to avoid the 
individualisation of CRSV.  Instead, the task is to properly capture the different patterns of 
these crimes, to link them to other gender-based crimes, and to contextualise these crimes 
within the broader conflict.  This challenge is made more significant because of two aspects of 
the ACJHPR.  The first aspect concerns the so-called ‘immunity’ clause (Article 46Abis), 
granting immunity to serving heads of state and senior state officials.  If such a clause had been 
in place in the former Yugoslavia, it is arguable that it would have been impossible to indict 
political and military leadership for CRSV while they held office during the war.  The issuing 
of these indictments against the serving head of state and state officials in Serbia was seen as 
having important legal consequences (such as evidencing the foreseeability element of 
command responsibility), as well as political (such as delegitimizing the existing regime), and 
social functions (such as deterring the ongoing commission of these crimes) in ICTY cases.24  
The second aspect concerns how to properly contextualise CRSV within a ‘regional’ or cross-
border conflict in national jurisdictions.  If prosecutions before national courts are limited to 
crimes committed in that territory, then it will become more difficult to accurately characterise 
CRSV, or to link it to the wider illegal conduct of the conflict. 
                                                      
23 Gorana Mlinarević and Nela Porobić Isaković, ‘Conceptualizing a comprehensive approach to transformative gender-
sensitive reparations: experiences from Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (forthcoming).  This analysis of the BiH State Court 
was developed with Ms Mlinarevic in our forthcoming paper, ‘A Gender Justice Framework for International Criminal 
Law’. 
24 Brammertz and Jarvis (n 9) 254–255; Michael Scharf ‘The Indictment of Slobodan Milosevic’, ASIL Insight (1999). 
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C. Addressing Gendered Stereotypes and Gender Bias 
 
The third challenge to building accountability for CRSV is how to address gendered 
stereotypes about CRSV and the gender bias of actors within criminal justice systems.  The 
experience of the ICTY and BiH State Court show that gendered stereotypes about CRSV are 
still commonplace.25  These include notions that conflict-related sexual violence is exclusively 
a personal or opportunistic crime, is not sufficiently violent or serious to constitute an 
international crime, or only constitutes an international crime if it is the subject of strategy or 
policy.  This experience also shows the potential significant gender bias of investigative, legal, 
and judicial actors.  This gender bias can be seen in a lack of investigation of CRSV, different 
charging of CRSV against men and women, disadvantageous assumptions that survivors of 
sexual violence are reluctant to testify due to stigma, or that female witnesses only have 
evidential value for proving sexual violence (rather than other international crimes).26  These 
ideas reflect wider social beliefs concerning male and female sexuality, how violence against 
men and women is characterised, and gender roles in society.  In both courts, the reviews of 
prosecutions by the ICTY OTP and the OSCE show that these gender stereotyping and gender 
bias impact upon the investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of CRSV.27  
 
It is highly likely that the ACJHPR will face similar challenges in building greater 
accountability for these crimes.  Unless there is a proactive approach to building gender and 
criminal expertise, there is little reason to believe that gender stereotypes and biases will not 
be present in the ACJHPR.  However, in a permanent court addressing these crimes, there is 
                                                      
25 See Brammertz and Jarvis (n 9), and OSCE (n 6). 
26 Ibid. 
27 See Brammertz and Jarvis (n 9), and OSCE (n 6). 
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more likelihood that such proactive policies can be developed because of the ongoing nature 
of prosecutions, and the capacity of the Court to build on the progressive human rights 
jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, such as Equality 
Now and Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA) v Federal Republic of Ethiopia, 
Communication 341/2007 (16 November 2015).  Nevertheless, this case also shows that in 
national courts, these obstacles may be both more onerous and difficult to address.  In most 
countries world-wide, domestic jurisdictions typically fail to deliver accountability for 
domestic sexual offences, and state responses to rape and sexual assault are generally weak.28  
As the experience of BiH State Court has shown, there is little reason to suppose that these 
failures would not be compounded in CRSV cases prosecuted before national courts (as they 
have been in BiH). 
 
D Addressing Institutional Obstacles 
 
The fourth challenge to addressing impunity for CRSV consists of institutional obstacles in 
criminal justice systems.  These institutional obstacles include gendered practices, culture, and 
systems that obstruct adequate CRSV prosecutions in criminal justice systems.  As identified 
by the ICTY, such obstacles may include inadequate gender competence and/or conflict-related 
sexual violence expertise, lack of leadership or commitment to prosecution, and the failure to 
develop or implement gender policies or strategies.29  
 
Without considerable institutional commitment and resources, the ACJHPR is also likely to 
                                                      
28 Equality Now, The World’s Shame, the Global Rape Epidemic: How Laws Around the World are Failing to Protect 
Women and Girls from Sexual Violence (2017), 
<https://www.equalitynow.org/sites/default/files/EqualityNowRapeLawReport2017_Single%20Pages.pdf> accessed 
17 August 2018. 
29 Brammertz and Jarvis (n 9), and ICTR Best Practice (n 9). 
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struggle to address these institutional obstacles.  To take the example of gender parity on the 
bench, there is an explicit reference to ‘equitable gender representation’ in the nomination and 
election of judges under Articles 3 and 7 of the Malabo Protocol.  Nevertheless, the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights has not yet achieved gender parity.30  This difficulty may 
be compounded by the substantive areas of legal expertise required for appointment to the 
ACJHPR, given that criminal, humanitarian, and international law have traditionally been male 
dominated areas of the profession.  While the situation is more complex at the regional level, 
similar issues of gender under-representation in the judiciary can be seen in national courts in 
African states.31  Like national courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such institutional obstacles 
to sexual violence prosecutions are likely to be faced by national courts in African states, with 
such obstacles becoming more evident in ‘lower’ or non-specialist ‘ordinary’ domestic courts.  
In line with the situation with courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, national courts in African 
states are also less likely to have established gender policies and strategies that would serve as 
a basis for addressing such obstacles. 
 
E. CRSV Prosecutions Before National Courts and Complementary Jurisdiction 
 
The fifth challenge concerns specific ‘national’ issues concerning domestic prosecutions of 
CRSV as an international crime.  The Malabo Protocol provides that national courts will have 
primacy over the ACJHR in regards to prosecutions of international crimes.  The jurisdictional 
structure of the Malabo Protocol follows the ICC in proposing complementary jurisdiction 
between the ACJHR and national courts (Article 46H).  This principle of ‘complementary 
                                                      
30 Josephine Dawani, ‘African Women Judges and Achieving Gender Parity on the African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’ (1 February 2017), <https://ilg2.org/2017/02/01/ african-women-judges-and-gender-parity-on-the-african-
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31 Josephine Jarpa Dawuni and Hon Akua Kuenyehia, eds. International Courts and the African Woman Judge: Unveiled 
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jurisdiction’ as set out in the Malabo Protocol provides that a case will only be admissible to 
the ACJHPR if the State with relevant jurisdiction is ‘unwilling or unable to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution’; the accused has not already been tried for the same conduct, and 
the case is of ‘sufficient gravity’ (Article 46H(a)–(d)).  While significant issues have been 
raised in scholarly commentary on the general operation of these provisions, this discussion 
focuses on the specific implications of these provisions for CRSV prosecutions. 
 
Given that the Malabo Protocol envisages that the majority of CRSV prosecutions will take 
place in national jurisdictions, this raises the issue of the specific difficulties faced by domestic 
prosecutions of CRSV.  The experience of the BiH State Court shows that domestic 
prosecutions face five key difficulties.  The first, and most obvious, is the broader conflict and 
post-conflict context.  This context produces significant capacity and commitment challenges, 
such as large numbers of complex cases, destroyed state infrastructure, de-legitimized criminal 
justice systems, political interests, and displacement or impoverishment of the population, for 
all domestic war crimes cases.32  However, ‘gender’ factors amplify the impact of these 
challenges for prosecuting CRSV cases.  For example, the ICTY notes, ‘[b]asic issues, such as 
the layout of court buildings and lack of witness waiting rooms, can exacerbate the trauma of 
sexual violence victims who have agreed to testify’.33  The deepening of gender structural 
inequalities during and after the conflict also impacted upon women’s access to justice.  Again, 
these impacts may be as basic but crucial as adequate healthcare and housing, or requiring 
financial support to travel or pay for childcare while attending trials. 
 
The second ‘national’ issue concerns existing obstacles to CRSV prosecutions in domestic 
systems.  While these issues have been referred to above, it should be noted that prosecutions 
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of CRSV before national courts raises specific obstacles because of existing national legal and 
cultural norms and practices.  For example, in the case of BiH prosecutions, this included 
restrictive definitions of sexual violence as an international and domestic crime that did not 
reflect international norms, lack of adequate witness protection, and insufficient prioritisation 
of CRSV cases.34  Similar issues are present in the other national jurisdictions of the successor 
states of the former Yugoslavia, but with the additional element of a lack of political will at 
state level to prosecute such crimes.  In the context of the former Yugoslavia, national CRSV 
prosecutions show the particular vulnerability of CRSV to these challenges, and the wide 
impunity gap that can emerge in national systems.  Given that the Malabo Protocol envisages 
a regional structure with primacy given to national courts, this structure raises the issue of how 
to address the specific difficulties and challenges faced by national courts in prosecuting these 
crimes.  Without addressing these issues, national courts will not be able to undertake effective 
or equitable CRSV prosecutions.  However, the experience of the ICTY OTP and BiH State 
Court also show that addressing these issues can significantly improve criminal accountability 
for CRSV. 
 
These challenges for building accountability for CRSV prosecutions at the national level raise 
the issue of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ models of complementary jurisdiction under the Malabo 
Protocol.  A ‘negative’ complementarity model concerns the criteria for assessing whether the 
ACJHPR has jurisdiction over a case on the grounds that a national court is ‘unwilling or 
unable’ to prosecute.  In relation to the ICC, feminist scholars have noted the limitations of a 
‘gender neutral’ approach to assessing negative complementary, which does not address the 
specific challenges of national CRSV prosecutions.35  Unless the ACJHPR explicitly considers 
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35 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘Gendered Harms and their Interface with International Criminal Law’ (2014) 16(4) 
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the ‘best practice’ standards for CRSV prosecutions outlined above as part of its criteria for 
assessing whether to exercise its jurisdiction, then it will not be able to fully contribute to 
building accountability in this area.  However, even if the ACJHPR were to follow this 
approach, there are two further issues that remain to be addressed.  The first is that 
‘complementary jurisdiction’ focuses upon the admissibility of a single case.  However, the 
impunity gap for CRSV prosecutions at national levels is only seen when prosecutions are 
considered as a whole, such that rates and quality of prosecutions are compared to other war 
crimes prosecutions and to the estimated prevalence of these offences.  The second concerns 
the final element of the criteria for admissibility to the ACJHPR, namely, that the case is of 
sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.  Unless CRSV is properly 
contextualised in the broader criminal campaign, and is not seen as an individual or 
opportunistic crime, then that case may be improperly characterised as of insufficient gravity 
to justify further action by the Court. 
 
In contrast, a ‘positive complementarity’ model focuses on ‘a proactive policy of cooperation 
aimed at promoting national proceedings’.36  While the ICC takes a narrow view of positive 
complementarity, it may be useful to consider a wider approach to positive complementarity 
in the complementary jurisdiction system of the ACJHPR.  In relation to the ICC, feminist 
scholars have argued that such ‘active’ complementarity is crucial for developing national 
accountability for CRSV.37  Drawing on the experiences of the former Yugoslavia, such a 
positive model would address: (a) how to ensure the harmonisation of standards (international 
legal norms) and best practice (legal and institutional) between the ACJHPR and national 
courts; (b) how to build upon legal traditions of national cultures in establishing or developing 
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national prosecutions (particularly important in a regional context with civil and common law 
traditions, as well as mixed systems); (c) how to provide sufficient economic and political 
resources to undertake these prosecutions at the national level; and (d) how to monitor the 
number and quality of prosecutions.  This broader approach would also address the potential 
shortcomings identified above concerning the admissibility criteria of the ACJHPR. 
 
F. Regional and International Accountability 
 
The structure of regional complementarity proposed under the Malabo Protocol raises wider 
issues for building accountability for CRSV at international and regional levels beyond that of 
the ACJHR.  The ‘regional’ complementarity model envisaged by the Protocol can be said to 
have two dimensions of ‘regional accountability’.  The first is vertical, and concerns the 
relationship between the ACJHR and national courts discussed above.  The second is horizontal 
regional accountability, and concerns the relationship between national courts in the regional 
system.  Horizontal regional accountability implies that all national courts in an affected region 
will undertake CRSV prosecutions.  The experience of the ICTY and Bosnia shows that 
regional co-operation, including extradition, evidence exchange, and witness protection, is 
crucial for successful prosecutions of cross-border international crimes.38  This experience 
underscores how inadequate co-operation negatively impacts upon building regional 
accountability, even where individual states, such as Bosnia, are themselves committed to 
prosecution.  For example, the OSCE has noted that the failure to extradite suspects from other 
successor states to Bosnia had impacted upon the ability of the judicial system to try CRSV 
                                                      
38 For further discussion, see Richard Steinberg, ed.  Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY (Martinus Nijhoff, 2011), and 
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cases.39  Where states are not fully committed to such prosecutions, then horizontal regional 
accountability cannot be achieved, as is the case in the former Yugoslavia.  The poor record of 
CRSV prosecutions in successor states other than Bosnia again shows the particular 
vulnerabilities of these crimes to failed prosecution where impunity gaps in legal systems are 
created.  Finally, it should be noted that international (at the UN level) and regional (European 
Union) policy focus and resources has also been crucial for building greater regional 
accountability for CRSV in the former Yugoslavia. 
 
The third dimension of building regional and national accountability for CRSV is international.  
The Malabo Protocol has been met by a number of serious criticisms, most notably regarding 
the so-called ‘immunity’ provision, and the relationship between the ICC and the ACJHPR.  
Given that the Malabo Protocol is silent on the relationship between the ICC and the proposed 
ACJHPR regional system, scholars have raised concerns regarding the relationship between 
these two jurisdictions, and the potentially problematic politics of establishing an alternative 
‘venue’ to the ICC, particularly in view of the ‘withdrawal strategy’ from the ICC proposed by 
the African Union.40  Any weakening of international norms and international systems of 
enforcement has serious implications for CRSV prosecutions.  Undermining international 
norms and enforcement – and the concomitant weakening of regional and national norms and 
enforcement – will contribute to the already significant impunity gap for these crimes.  For this 
reason, if the aim is to build accountability for CRSV at all levels, then efforts to build regional 
accountability should not be undertaken in isolation from efforts to strengthen international 
criminal law and humanitarian law regimes.  Rather, they should be undertaken with a view to 
how regional and international systems can mutually complement and strengthen greater 
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accountability for CRSV. 
 
G. CRSV and Gender-Based Crimes 
 
The final challenge is to consider the consequences of focusing on CRSV for prosecutions in 
particular, and for gender justice more broadly.  In the case of the former Yugoslavian conflicts, 
the struggle to date to prosecute CRSV has resulted in the neglect of gender-based crimes.  
Sexual violence is not the only gender-based crime committed in conflict.  Other gender-based 
crimes are also likely to form an integral part of the conduct of war.  The Malabo Protocol has 
made a step in this direction by following the ICC’s inclusion of ‘gender’ as a prohibited 
ground of persecution as a crime against humanity (Article 28C(1)(h)).  The Protocol also 
reflects the progressive jurisprudence of the ICTR and ICTY, which recognises gender-based 
crimes as core crimes, such as sexual violence against women as genocide.41  The Protocol 
stipulates sexual violence as a material element of all core crimes, including such as sexual 
violence as genocide.  (Article 28B(f)). 
 
The ACJHPR could usefully further elaborate the current legal norms of gender-based crimes 
in the elements of crimes or in its jurisprudence.  For example, the gender elements of existing 
core crimes, such as elaborating how attacks directed towards women on the basis of their 
gender can be an element of genocide, could be further developed in the elements of crimes.  
Equally importantly, it could lead the development of the criminalisation of other distinctive 
harms experienced by women in war, by, for example, recognising the disproportionate impact 
of particular means and methods of warfare upon women as members of the civilian 
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population.42  Accordingly, a central issue for prosecutions involves developing the legal 
categories of, and strategies for prosecuting, gender-based crimes. 
 
H. Gender Strategies for Building Criminal Accountability for CRSV and Gender-Based 
Crimes 
 
Neither the ICTY nor BiH State Court developed comprehensive gender policies or strategies 
across all sections of the court from their establishment.  Subsequently, there has been uneven 
development and implementation of such policies and strategies within these courts.  However, 
the efforts of the ICTY and BiH State Court have also shown the importance of developing 
such policies and strategies.  As noted by both the ICTY and the OSCE, the absence of gender 
policies and strategies has a negative impact upon the number and quality of prosecutions and 
outcomes, while the development and implementation of these policies has a positive impact 
upon accountability for CRSV.43  Patricia Sellers has persuasively argued that ‘a gender 
strategy is not a luxury’ in prosecuting international crimes, and is particularly important for 
complementarity systems, such as the ICC.44  The complementary system that is to be 
established by the Malabo Protocol is no exception. 
 
The experiences of regional and national prosecutions in the former Yugoslavia reveal 
important lessons for building greater accountability for CRSV and gender-based crimes that 
regional and national prosecutions proceeding under the Malabo Protocol can usefully draw 
on.  These include developing gender policies and strategies that include: 
                                                      
42 For discussion, see Judith Gardam and Michelle Jarvis, Women, Armed Conflict, and International Law (Kluwer, 
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43 See Brammetz and Jarvis (n 9), and OSCE (n 6). 
44 Patricia Viseur Sellers, ‘Gender Strategy is Not Luxury for International Courts Symposium: Prosecuting Sexual and 
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i. development of elements of crimes, modes of liability, and evidential standards; 
ii. accurate charging of offences against men and women, with proportionate numbers of 
male and female victims; 
iii. prosecutorial strategies that undertake jurisprudential development and representative 
cases; 
iv. contextual charging and prosecution, which involves situating conflict-related sexual 
violence within wider patterns of gender-based harms, and also within the broader 
context of patterns of illegality in the conflict; 
v. equal access to justice for male and female witnesses, meaningful witness support in 
all phases of the criminal process (before, during, and after trial), provision of victim-
witness representatives, and links to reparations and specialized support programmes; 
vi. regular review of sexual violence and gender-based crimes patterns of prosecution, trial 
practices, and sentencing; 
vii. ‘outreach’, public information, and advocacy strategies for these crimes; and 
viii. strengthening regional and international vertical and horizontal accountability. 
 
2.2 The Second Challenge for Building Accountability for CRSV:  
Linking Criminal Accountability for International Crimes and Post-Conflict Justice 
Processes 
 
Criminal accountability for international crimes can only be a partial component of the wider 
aims of building accountability for CRSV and gender-based crimes.  Prosecutions alone do not 
address the structural and social causes and consequences of these crimes.  As the example of 
the former Yugoslavia shows, prosecutions in themselves do not provide gender justice, 
whether in terms of addressing the individual material and social needs of survivors, or the 
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broader collective challenge of transforming gendered inequalities.45  While CRSV 
prosecutions are clearly supported by victims and the wider society, there has been a 
disconnected approach to criminal, civil, and transitional justice policies.  This approach did 
not integrate other elements of gender justice, such as civil justice policies (such as provision 
of reparations, provision of psycho-social or medical support, or recognition as civilian 
victims), or transitional justice policies (such as wider post-conflict programmes aimed at post-
conflict reconciliation).  As a result, the needs of the survivors were not met, and gender 
inequalities were further deepened and entrenched.46  The example of the former Yugoslavia 
clearly shows the necessity of linking ‘regional’ prosecutions of gender-based and sexual 
violence crimes, integrating prosecutions and national post-conflict processes, and including 
women and gender policies in post-conflict processes.  Like the ICTY, the establishment of the 
ACJHPR under the Malabo Protocol is tied to the promotion of ‘peace, security, and stability’ 
(as set out in the Preamble of the Protocol).  Given this context, it is crucial to address the 
question of how to link criminal justice and post-conflict gender justice. 
 
Recent theories of ‘transformative gender justice’47 propose a ‘transformative justice [which] 
challenges fundamentally unjust power relations within society; power relations that are often 
at the heart of the conflict itself’.48  This approach acknowledges that international criminal 
justice may reproduce the gender norms and inequalities that underlie gender-based crimes 
                                                      
45 For an important feminist analysis of these issues, see see WILPF, ‘Concept and Framework for Gender-Sensitive 
Reparations Programme for Civilian Victims of War in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (2016) 
<http://womenorganizingforchange.org/Development/wp-content/ uploads/2016/02/Reparations-BiH.pdf> accessed 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (2017) <http://womenorganizingforchange.org/en/resource-library/> accessed 13 August 
2018. 
46 See, for example, Concluding Observations on the Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, (CEDAW/C/BIH/4–5), Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 30 July 2013, 
and Rashida Manjoo, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences on 
her Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Doc A/HRC/23/49/Add 3, 4 June 2013. 
47 See Jelke Boesten and Polly Wilding ‘Transformative Gender Justice: Setting an Agenda’ (2015) 51 Women’s Studies 
International Forum 75–80. 
48 Nahla Valji, Gender Justice and Reconciliation (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Paper No. 35, 3, 2007). 
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even as it seeks to provide justice for them.  Transformative gender justice addresses this 
challenge by insisting that international criminal justice must be part of a process that 
transforms, rather than reproduces, gendered inequalities.  This new approach links post-
conflict justice for gender harms to social transformation, in which international justice does 
not sustain the power relations that produce the violence of war.  Instead, it seeks to change 
them.  Accordingly, it ties international criminal accountability to broader processes of social 
change in conflict settings. 
 
Accordingly, the second set of challenges for building accountability for CRSV and gender-
based crimes concerns how to tie criminal accountability to broader post-conflict processes to 
enable transformative social change and ensure the non-recurrence of these crimes.  Without 
the integration of accountability for CRSV into post-conflict justice processes, broader 
structural and social conditions for these crimes will not be addressed, and there can be no 
guarantee of non-repetition.  As Rashida Manjoo observed: 
[g]uarantees of non-repetition, if duly implemented, have the potential to detect the 
enabling conditions and long-term legacies of gender violence, and can therefore 
be a suitable platform for broader structural reforms for all women, not just victims, 
and hence for the construction of a more inclusive and gender-just political order.49  
 
Regional and national prosecutions must involve active engagement with both the affected 
victims and with the broader society if effective strategies to end impunity and non-recurrence 
of these crimes are to be developed in conflict contexts.  Unless this broader gender justice 
approach is taken, prosecutions are less effective in providing accountability for these crimes.  
They will not provide justice to these victims, or support post-conflict reconciliation. 
 
The crucial aspect of this challenge is how to integrate strategies for criminal and civil 
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accountability for sexual violence and gender-based crimes at regional and national levels.  
This challenge involves incorporating international standards for prosecutions in national 
jurisdictions, establishing investigative, implementing, and review mechanisms, and adopting 
relevant standards of criminal and civil accountability.  It also involves incorporating criminal 
justice into post-conflict strategies, as well as linking strategies for criminal prosecutions and 
civil justice programmes (including reparations, advocacy, economic and psycho-social 
support). 
 
A Gender Strategies for Linking Criminal Justice and Post-Conflict Gender Justice 
 
It is now widely recognised in United Nations (un) policy and current scholarship that gender 
strategies are also not ‘a luxury’ for conflict-affected countries seeking to address the causes 
and consequences of these crimes.50  Drawing on the experience of regional and national 
prosecutions in the former Yugoslavia, gender strategies for building greater accountability for 
CRSV and gender-based crimes in the context of post-conflict peace processes should include: 
i. meaningful and active participation of women in all levels of peace talks and decision-
making mechanisms, as well as in all criminal and civil justice institutions, and any 
bodies responsible for implementation; 
ii. assessment of gaps in existing criminal and civil justice provision at the national level; 
iii. identification of implementing mechanisms and parties, including review, report, 
‘outreach’ and public information elements; and 
iv. provision of reparations, psycho-social and economic support, and strategic advocacy. 
The specific content of these gender strategies cannot be identified ‘in the abstract’.  The 
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appropriate approach and application are necessarily determined by the nature of the conflict 
context.  Feminist scholars have repeatedly shown that ‘templates, applied uniformly across 
very different transitional contexts, will inevitably fail to consider the political dynamics 
driving transitional justice in a particular context’. 51  Too often, they also fail to consider the 
particular social and economic dynamics of a conflict context.  For these reasons, gender 
strategies for linking criminal justice and post-conflict gender justice must always be 
contextual. 
 
B A Gender Justice Framework for CRSV and Gender-Based Crimes at National and 
Regional Levels 
 
In the context of CRSV, ‘gender analysis’ is typically focussed upon gender representation and 
gender policies in courts, understood as the ‘consideration of whether, and in what ways, 
crimes, including sexual and gender-based crimes, are related to gender norms and inequalities’ 
in prosecutorial practice.52  However, to build regional and national accountability for CRSV 
and gender-based crimes requires developing a broader approach that links gender strategies 
for courts to the broader aim of gender justice in post-conflict contexts.  This larger aim is to 
build meaningful justice processes that can transform (rather than reproduce), gendered norms 
and inequalities in conflict-affected countries.  This broader approach involves using a gender 
justice framework that integrates the gender strategies for criminal justice and post-conflict 
justice outlined above. 
 
How, then, to build a contextual gender justice framework that might serve to complement the 
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Malabo Protocols?  On the basis of the above discussion of challenges to building 
accountability for CRSV and gender-based crimes, and the outline of potential elements of 
gender strategies for criminal and post-conflict justice, it is possible to identify a set of guiding 
principles that can serve as the basis for developing a gender justice framework for the Malabo 
Protocols.  These principles include: 
i. Developing appropriate models of the concepts of gender and gender-based crimes for 
international crimes; 
ii. Undertaking doctrinal development of legal norms, particularly in relation to 
substantive elements and modes of liability; 
iii. Identifying and addressing gender norms and power biases in the values, design, 
culture, and established practices of legal institutions; 
iv. Integrating gender analysis of the conflict into criminal and civil justice processes; 
v. Providing significant and active victim participation and protection in the criminal 
process; and 
vi. Undertaking active engagement with the affected society to incorporate prosecutions 
into post-conflict social transformation. 
 
Given that in every particular context the specific policies, guidelines and protocols of each 
gender justice framework will be different, the guiding principles outlined above are intended 
to open, rather than to end, the important discussion of how to build regional and national 
accountability for CRSV and gender-based crimes.  Developing a contextual and 
complementary gender justice framework to the Malabo Protocol is the starting point for a 
wider discussion of how to undertake this challenging task.  Inevitably also, that gender justice 
framework will evolve in line with developments in the ACJHPR and the wider regional and 
national contexts. 
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3 Conclusion 
 
The experience of building ‘regional accountability’ for CRSV in the former Yugoslavia has 
shown the importance of prosecuting CRSV, and that CRSV can be prosecuted successfully.  
However, there are a number of significant legal, social, and political challenges in building 
accountability for these crimes.  These challenges can be summarised as how to develop ‘best 
practice’ within regional and national courts, and how to link these prosecutions to peace 
processes and post-conflict reconstruction.  These experiences also show that addressing these 
challenges requires recognising that gender strategies and policies are essential elements of 
building greater national and regional accountability for these crimes.  To this end, this article 
identifies six principles that can form the basis for developing a contextual gender justice 
framework to complement the Malabo Protocol.  Ultimately, the successful development and 
implementation of such a framework will be a crucial part of building national and regional 
accountability for sexual violence and gender-based crimes committed during conflict. 
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